One Up On Wall Street : How To Use What You Already Know To Make Money In The Market彼得·林奇的成功投资 电子书 pdf 百度云 下载 epub 2025 免费 mobi 在线

This book was written to offer encouragement and basic

information to the individual investor. Who knew it would go

through thirty printings and sell more than one million copies? As

this latest edition appears eleven years beyond the first, I'm

convinced that the same principles that helped me perform well at

the Fidelity Magellan Fund still apply to investing in stocks

today.

It's been a remarkable stretch since One Up on Wall Street hit the

bookstores in 1989. I left Magellan in May, 1990, and pundits said

it was a brilliant move. They congratulated me for getting out at

the right time -- just before the collapse of the great bull

market. For the moment, the pessimists looked smart. The country's

major banks flirted with insolvency, and a few went belly up. By

early fall, war was brewing in Iraq. Stocks suffered one of their

worst declines in recent memory. But then the war was won, the

banking system survived, and stocks rebounded.

Some rebound! The Dow is up more than fourfold since October, 1990,

from the 2,400 level to 11,000 and beyond -- the best decade for

stocks in the twentieth century. Nearly 50 percent of U.S.

households own stocks or mutual funds, up from 32 percent in 1989.

The market at large has created $25 trillion in new wealth, which

is on display in every city and town. If this keeps up, somebody

will write a book called The Billionaire Next Door.

More than $4 trillion of that new wealth is invested in mutual

funds, up from $275 billion in 1989. The fund bonanza is okay by

me, since I managed a fund. But it also must mean a lot of amateur

stockpickers did poorly with their picks. If they'd done better on

their own in this mother of all bull markets, they wouldn't have

migrated to funds to the extent they have. Perhaps the information

contained in this book will set some errant stockpickers on a more

profitable path.

Since stepping down at Magellan, I've become an individual investor

myself. On the charitable front, I raise scholarship money to send

inner-city kids of all faiths to Boston Catholic schools.

Otherwise, I work part-time at Fidelity as a fund trustee and as an

adviser/trainer for young research analysts. Lately my leisure time

is up at least thirtyfold, as I spend more time with my family at

home and abroad.

Enough about me. Let's get back to my favorite subject: stocks.

From the start of this bull market in August 1982, we've seen the

greatest advance in stock prices in U.S. history, with the Dow up

fifteenfold. In Lynch lingo that's a "fifteenbagger." I'm

accustomed to finding fifteenbaggers in a variety of successful

companies, but a fifteenbagger in the market at large is a stunning

reward. Consider this: From the top in 1929 through 1982, the Dow

produced only a fourbagger: up from 248 to 1,046 in a half century!

Lately stock prices have risen faster as they've moved higher. It

took the Dow 8 1/3 years to double from 2,500 to 5,000, and only 3

1/2 years to double from 5,000 to 10,000. From 1995-99 we saw an

unprecedented five straight years where stocks returned 20 percent

plus. Never before has the market recorded more than two

back-to-back 20 percent gains.

Wall Street's greatest bull market has rewarded the believers and

confounded the skeptics to a degree neither side could have

imagined in the doldrums of the early 1970s, when I first took the

helm at Magellan. At that low point, demoralized investors had to

remind themselves that bear markets don't last forever, and those

with patience held on to their stocks and mutual funds for the

fifteen years it took the Dow and other averages to regain the

prices reached in the mid-1960s. Today it's worth reminding

ourselves that bull markets don't last forever and that patience is

required in both directions.

On page 280 of this book I say the breakup of ATT in 1984 may have

been the most significant stock market development of that era.

Today it's the Internet, and so far the Internet has passed me by.

All along I've been technophobic. My experience shows you don't

have to be trendy to succeed as an investor. In fact, most great

investors I know (Warren Buffett, for starters) are technophobes.

They don't own what they don't understand, and neither do I. I

understand Dunkin' Donuts and Chrysler, which is why both inhabited

my portfolio, I understand banks, savings-and-loans, and their

close relative, Fannie Mae. I don't visit the Web. I've never

surfed on it or chatted across it. Without expert help (from my

wife or my children, for instance) I couldn't find the Web.

Over the Thanksgiving holidays in 1997, I shared eggnog with a

Web-tolerant friend in New York. I mentioned that my wife, Carolyn,

liked the mystery novelist Dorothy Sayers. The friend sat down at a

nearby computer and in a couple of clicks pulled up the entire list

of Sayers titles, plus customer reviews and the one-to five-star

ratings (on the literary Web sites, authors are rated like fund

managers). I bought four Sayers novels for Carolyn, picked the gift

wrapping, typed in our home address, and crossed one Christmas gift

off my list. This was my introduction to Amazon.com.

Later on you'll read how I discovered some of my best stocks

through eating or shopping, sometimes long before other

professional stock hounds came across them. Since Amazon existed in

cyberspace, and not in suburban mall space, I ignored it. Amazon

wasn't beyond my comprehension -- the business was as

understandable as a dry cleaner's. Also, in 1997 it was reasonably

priced relative to its prospects, and it was well-financed. But I

wasn't flexible enough to see opportunity in this new guise. Had I

bothered to do the research, I would have seen the huge market for

this sort of shopping and Amazon's ability to capture it. Alas, I

didn't. Meanwhile, Amazon was up tenfold (a "tenbagger" in Lynch

parlance) in 1998 alone.

Amazon is one of at least five hundred "dot.com" stocks that have

performed miraculous levitations. In high-tech and dot.com circles,

it's not unusual for a newly launched public offering to rise

tenfold in less time than it takes Stephen King to pen another

thriller. These investments don't require much patience. Before the

Internet came along, companies had to grow their way into the

billion-dollar ranks. Now they can reach billion-dollar valuations

before they've turned a profit or, in some cases, before they've

collected any revenues. Mr. Market (a fictional proxy for stocks in

general) doesn't wait for a newborn Web site to prove itself in

real life the way, say, Wal-Mart or Home Depot proved themselves in

the last generation.

With today's hot Internet stocks, fundamentals are old hat. (The

term old hat is old hat in itself, proving that I'm old hat for

bringing it up.) The mere appearance of a dot and a com, and the

exciting concept behind it, is enough to convince today's optimists

to pay for a decade's worth of growth and prosperity in advance.

Subsequent buyers pay escalating prices based on the futuristic

"fundamentals," which improve with each uptick.

Judging by the Maserati sales in Silicon Valley, dot.coms are

highly rewarding to entrepreneurs who take them public and early

buyers who make timely exits. But I'd like to pass along a word of

caution to people who buy shares after they've levitated. Does it

make sense to invest in a dot.com at prices that already reflect

years of rapid earnings growth that may or may not occur? By the

way I pose this, you've already figured out my answer is "no." With

many of these new issues, the stock price doubles, triples, or even

quadruples on the first day of trading. Unless your broker can

stake your claim to a meaningful allotment of shares at the initial

offering price -- an unlikely prospect since Internet offerings are

more coveted, even, than Super Bowl tickets -- you'll miss a big

percent of the gain. Perhaps you'll miss the entire gain, since

some dot.coms hit high prices on the first few trading sessions

that they never reach again.

If you feel left out of the dot.com jubilee, remind yourself that

very few dot.com investors benefit from the full ride. It's

misleading to measure the progress of these stocks from the

offering price that most buyers can't get. Those who are allotted

shares are lucky to receive more than a handful.

In spite of the instant gratification that surrounds me, I've

continued to invest the old-fashioned way. I own stocks where

results depend on ancient fundamentals: a successful company enters

new markets, its earnings rise, and the share price follows along.

Or a flawed company turns itself around. The typical big winner in

the Lynch portfolio (I continue to pick my share of losers, too!)

generally takes three to ten years or more to play out.

Owing to the lack of earnings in dot.com land, most dot.coms can't

be rated using the standard price/earnings yardstick. In other

words, there's no "e" in the all-important "p/e" ratio. Without a

"p/e" ratio to track, investors focus on the one bit of data that

shows up everywhere: the stock price! To my mind, the stock price

is the least useful information you can track, and it's the most

widely tracked. When One Up was written in 1989, a lone ticker tape

ran across the bottom of the Financial News Network. Today you can

find a ticker tape on a variety of channels, while others display

little boxes that showcase the Dow, the S&P 500, and so forth.

Channel surfers can't avoid knowing where the market closed. On the

popular Internet portals, you can click on your customized

portfolio and get the latest gyrations for every holding. Or you

can get stock prices on 800 lines, pagers, and voice mail.

To me, this barrage of price tags sends the wrong message. If my

favorite Internet company sells for $30 a share, and yours sells

for $10, then people who focus on price would say that mine is the

superior company. This is a dangerous delusion. What Mr. Market

pays for a stock today or next week doesn't tell you which company

has the best chance to succeed two to three years down the

information superhighway. If you can follow only one bit of data,

follow the earnings -- assuming the company in question has

earnings. As you'll see in this text, I subscribe to the crusty

notion that sooner or later earnings make or break an investment in

equities. What the stock price does today, tomorrow, or next week

is only a distraction.

The Internet is far from the first innovation that changed the

world. The railroad, telephone, the car, the airplane, and the TV

can all lay claim to revolutionary effects on the average life, or

at least on the prosperous top quarter of the global population.

These new industries spawned new companies, only a few of which

survived to dominate the field. The same thing likely will happen

with the Internet. A big name or two will capture the territory,

the way McDonald's did with burgers or Schlumberger did with oil

services. Shareholders in those triumphant companies will prosper,

while shareholders in the laggards, the has-beens, and the

should-have-beens will lose money. Perhaps you'll be clever enough

to pick the big winners that join the exclusive club of companies

that earn $1 billion a year.

Though the typical dot.com has no earnings as yet, you can do a

thumbnail analysis that gives a general idea of what the company

will need to earn in the future to justify the stock price today.

Let's take a hypothetical case: DotCom.com. First, you find the

"market capitalization" ("market cap" for short) by multiplying the

number of shares outstanding (let's say 100 million) by the current

stock price (let's say $100 a share). One hundred million times

$100 equals $10 billion, so that's the market cap for

DotCom.com.

Whenever you invest in any company, you're looking for its market

cap to rise. This can't happen unless buyers are paying higher

prices for the shares, making your investment more valuable. With

that in mind, before DotCom.com can turn into a tenbagger, its

market cap must increase tenfold, from $10 billion to $100 billion.

Once you've established this target market cap, you have to ask

yourself: What will DotCom.com need to earn to support a $100

billion valuation? To get a ballpark answer, you can apply a

generic price/earnings ratio for a fast-growing operation -- in

today's heady market, let's say 40 times earnings.

Permit me a digression here. On page 170 I mention how wonderful

companies become risky investments when people overpay for them,

using McDonald's as exhibit A. In 1972 the stock was bid up to a

precarious 50 times earnings. With no way to "live up to these

expectations," the price fell from $75 to $25, a great buying

opportunity at a "more realistic" 13 times earnings.

On the following page I also mention the bloated 500 times earnings

shareholders paid for Ross Perot's Electronic Data Systems. At 500

times earnings, I noted, "it would take five centuries to make back

your investment, if the EDS earnings stayed constant," Thanks to

the Internet, 500 times earnings has lost its shock value, and so

has 50 times earnings or, in our theoretical example, 40 times

earnings for DotCom.com.

In any event, to become a $100 billion enterprise, we can guess

that DotCom.com eventually must earn $2.5 billion a year. Only

thirty-three U.S. corporations earned more than $2.5 billion in

1999, so for this to happen to DotCom.com, it will have to join the

exclusive club of big winners, along with the likes of Microsoft. A

rare feat, indeed.

I'd like to end this brief Internet discussion on a positive note.

There are three ways to invest in this trend without having to buy

into a hope and an extravagant market cap. The first is an offshoot

of the old "picks and shovels" strategy: During the Gold Rush, most

would-be miners lost money, but people who sold them picks,

shovels, tents, and blue jeans (Levi Strauss) made a nice profit.

Today, you can look for non-Internet companies that indirectly

benefit from Internet traffic (package delivery is an obvious

example); or you can invest in manufacturers of switches and

related gizmos that keep the traffic moving.

The second is the so-called "free Internet play." That's where an

Internet business is embedded in a non-Internet company with real

earnings and a reasonable stock price. I'm not naming names -- you

can do your own sleuthing -- but several intriguing free plays have

come to my attention. In a typical situation, the company at large

is valued, say, at $800 million in today's market, while its

fledgling Internet operation is estimated to be worth $1 billion,

before it has proven itself. If the Internet operation lives up to

its promise, it could prove very rewarding -- that part of the

company may be "spun off" so it trades as its own stock. Or, if the

Internet venture doesn't do well, the fact that it's an adjunct to

the company's regular line of work protects investors on the

downside.

The third is the tangential benefit, where an old-fashioned "brick

and mortar" business benefits from using the Internet to cut costs,

streamline operations, become more efficient, and therefore more

profitable. A generation ago, scanners were installed in

supermarkets. This reduced pilferage, brought inventories under

better control, and was a huge boon to supermarket chains.

Going forward, the Internet and its handmaidens will create some

great success stories, but at this point we've mostly got great

expectations and inefficient pricing. Companies valued at $500

million today may triumph, while companies valued at $10 billion

may not be worth a dime. As expectations turn to reality, the

winners will be more obvious than they are today. Investors who see

this will have time to act on their "edge."

Back to Microsoft, a 100-bagger I overlooked. Along with Cisco and

Intel, that high-tech juggernaut posted explosive earnings almost

from the start. Microsoft went public in 1986 at 15 cents a share.

Three years later you could buy a share for under $1, and from

there it advanced eightyfold. (The stock has "split" several times

along the way, so original shares never actually sold for 15 cents

-- for further explanation, see the footnote on page 34.) If you

took the Missouri "show me" approach and waited to buy Microsoft

until it triumphed with Windows 95, you still made seven times your

money. You didn't have to be a programmer to notice Microsoft

everywhere you looked. Except in the Apple orchard, all new

computers came equipped with the Microsoft operating system and

Microsoft Windows. Apples were losing their appeal. The more

computers that used Windows, the more the software guys wrote

programs for Windows and not for Apple. Apple was squeezed into a

corner, where it sold boxes to 7-10 percent of the market.

Meanwhile the box makers that ran Microsoft programs (Dell,

Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, IBM, and so on) waged fierce price wars to

sell more boxes. This endless skirmish hurt the box makers'

earnings, but Microsoft was unaffected. Bill Gates's company wasn't

in the box business; it sold the "gas" that ran the boxes.

Cisco is another marquee performer. The stock price is up 480-fold

since it went public in 1990. I overlooked this incredible winner

for the usual reasons, but a lot of people must have noticed it.

Businesses at large hired Cisco to help them link their computers

into networks; then colleges hired Cisco to computerize the dorms,

Students, teachers, and visiting parents could have noticed this

development. Maybe some of them went home, did the research, and

bought the stock.

I mention Microsoft and Cisco to add contemporary examples to

illustrate a major theme of this book. An amateur investor can pick

tomorrow's big winners by paying attention to new developments at

the workplace, the mall, the auto showrooms, the restaurants, or

anywhere a promising new enterprise makes its debut. While I'm on

the subject, a clarification is in order.

Charles Barkley, a basketball player noted for shooting from the

lip, once claimed he was misquoted in his own autobiography. I

don't claim to be misquoted in this book, but I've been

misinterpreted on one key point. Here's my disclaimer.

Peter Lynch doesn't advise you to buy stock in your favorite store

just because you like shopping in the store, nor should you buy

stock in a manufacturer because it makes your favorite product or a

restaurant because you like the food. Liking a store, a product, or

a restaurant is a good reason to get interested in a company and

put it on your research list, but it's not enough of a reason to

own the stock! Never invest in any company before you've done the

homework on the company's earnings prospects, financial condition,

competitive position, plans for expansion, and so forth.

If you own a retail company, another key factor in the analysis is

figuring out whether the company is nearing the end of its

expansion phase -- what I call the "late innings" in its ball game.

When a Radio Shack or a Toys "R" Us has established itself in 10

percent of the country, it's a far different prospect than having

stores in 90 percent of the country. You have to keep track of

where the future growth is coming from and when it's likely to slow

down.

Nothing has occurred to shake my conviction that the typical

amateur has advantages over the typical professional fund jockey.

In 1989 the pros enjoyed quicker access to better information, but

the information gap has closed. A decade ago amateurs could get

information on a company in three ways: from the company itself,

from Value Line or Standard & Poor's research sheets, or from

reports written by in-house analysts at the brokerage firm where

the amateurs kept an account. Often these reports were mailed from

headquarters, and it took several days for the information to

arrive.

Today an array of analysts' reports is available on-line, where any

browser can call them up at will. News alerts on your favorite

companies are delivered automatically to your e-mail address. You

can find out if insiders are buying or selling or if a stock has

been upgraded or downgraded by brokerage houses. You can use

customized screens to search for stocks with certain

characteristics. You can track mutual funds of all varieties,

compare their records, find the names of their top ten holdings.

You can click on to the "briefing book" heading that's attached to

the on-line version of The Wall Street Journal and Barron's, and

get a snapshot review of almost any publicly traded company. From

there you can access "Zack's" and get a summary of ratings from all

the analysts who follow a particular stock.

Again thanks to the Internet, the cost of buying and selling stocks

has been drastically reduced for the small investor, the way it was

reduced for institutional investors in 1975. On-line trading has

pressured traditional brokerage houses to reduce commissions and

transaction fees, continuing a trend that began with the birth of

the discount broker two decades ago.

You may be wondering what's happened to my investing habits since I

left Magellan. Instead of following thousands of companies, now I

follow maybe fifty. (I continue to serve on investment committees

at various foundations and charitable groups, but in all of these

cases we hire portfolio managers and let them pick the stocks.)

Trendy investors might think the Lynch family portfolio belongs in

the New England Society of Antiquities. It contains some

savings-and-loans that I bought at bargain-basement prices during a

period when the S&Ls were unappreciated. These stocks have had

a terrific run, and I'm still holding on to some of them. (Selling

long-term winners subjects you to an IRS bear market -- a 20

percent tax on the proceeds.) I also own several growth companies

that I've held since the 1980s, and a few since the 1970s. These

businesses continue to prosper, yet the stocks still appear to be

reasonably priced. Beyond that, I'm still harboring an ample supply

of clunkers that sell for considerably less than the price I paid.

I'm not keeping these disappointment companies because I'm stubborn

or nostalgic. I'm keeping them because in each of these companies,

the finances are in decent shape and there's evidence of better

times ahead.

My clunkers remind me of an important point: You don't need to make

money on every stock you pick. In my experience, six out of ten

winners in a portfolio can produce a satisfying result. Why is

this? Your losses are limited to the amount you invest in each

stock (it can't go lower than zero), while your gains have no

absolute limit. Invest $1,000 in a clunker and in the worst case,

maybe you lose $1,000. Invest $1,000 in a high achiever, and you

could make $10,000, $15,000, $20,000, and beyond over several

years. All you need for a lifetime of successful investing is a few

big winners, and the pluses from those will overwhelm the minuses

from the stocks that don't work out.

Let me give you an update on two companies I don't own but that I

wrote about in this book: Bethlehem Steel and General Electric.

Both teach a useful lesson. I mentioned that shares of Bethlehem,

an aging blue chip, had been in decline since 1960. A famous old

company, it seems, can be just as unrewarding to investors as a

shaky start-up. Bethlehem, once a symbol of American global clout,

has continued to disappoint. It sold for $60 in 1958 and by 1989

had dropped to $17, punishing loyal shareholders as well as bargain

hunters who thought they'd found a deal. Since 1989 the price has

taken another fall, from $17 to the low single digits, proving that

a cheap stock can always get cheaper. Someday, Bethlehem Steel may

rise again. But assuming that will happen is wishing, not

investing.

I recommended General Electric on a national TV show (it's been a

tenbagger since), but in the book I mention that GE's size (market

value $39 billion; annual profits $3 billion) would make it

difficult for the company to increase those profits at a rapid

rate. In fact, the company that brings good things to life has

brought more upside to its shareholders than I'd anticipated.

Against the odds and under the savvy leadership of Jack Welch, this

corporate hulk has broken into a profitable trot. Welch, who

recently announced his retirement, prodded GE's numerous divisions

into peak performance, using excess cash to buy new businesses and

to buy back shares. GE's triumph in the 1990s shows the importance

of keeping up with a company's story.

Buying back shares brings up another important change in the

market: the dividend becoming an endangered species. I write about

its importance on page 204, but the old method of rewarding

shareholders seems to have gone the way of the black-footed ferret.

The bad part about the disappearing dividend is that regular checks

in the mail gave investors an income stream and also a reason to

hold on to stocks during periods when stock prices failed to

reward. Yet in 1999 the dividend yield on the five hundred

companies in the S&P 500 sank to an all-time low since World

War II: near 1 percent.

It's true that interest rates are lower today than they were in

1989, so you'd expect yields on bonds and dividends on stocks to be

lower. As stock prices rise, the dividend yield naturally falls.

(If a $50 stock pays a $5 dividend, it yields 10 percent; when the

stock price hits $100, it yields 5 percent.) Meanwhile companies

aren't boosting their dividends the way they once did.

"What is so unusual," observed The New York Times (October 7,

1999), "is that the economy is doing so well even while companies

are growing more reluctant to raise their dividends." In the

not-so-distant past, when a mature, healthy company routinely

raised the dividend, it was a sign of prosperity. Cutting a

dividend or failing to raise it was a sign of trouble. Lately,

healthy companies are skimping on their dividends and using the

money to buy back their own shares, à la General Electric. Reducing

the supply of shares increases the earnings per share, which

eventually rewards shareholders, although they don't reap the

reward until they sell.

If anybody's responsible for the disappearing dividend, it's the

U.S. government, which taxes corporate profits, then taxes

corporate dividends at the full rate, for so-called unearned

income. To help their shareholders avoid this double taxation,

companies have abandoned the dividend in favor of the buyback

strategy, which boosts the stock price. This strategy subjects

shareholders to increased capital gains taxes if they sell their

shares, but long-term capital gains are taxed at half the rate of

ordinary income taxes.

Speaking of long-term gains, in eleven years' worth of luncheon and

dinner speeches, I've asked for a show of hands: "How many of you

are long-term investors in stocks?" To date, the vote is unanimous

-- everybody's a long-term investor, including day traders in the

audience who took a couple of hours off. Long-term investing has

gotten so popular, it's easier to admit you're a crack addict than

to admit you're a short-term investor.

Stock market news has gone from hard to find (in the 1970s and

early 1980s), then easy to find (in the late 1980s), then hard to

get away from. The financial weather is followed as closely as the

real weather: highs, lows, troughs, turbulence, and endless

speculation about what's next and how to handle it. People are

advised to think long-term, but the constant comment on every

gyration puts people on edge and keeps them focused on the short

term. It's a challenge not to act on it. If there were a way to

avoid the obsession with the latest ups and downs, and check stock

prices every six months or so, the way you'd check the oil in a

car, investors might be more relaxed.

Nobody believes in long-term investing more passionately than I do,

but as with the Golden Rule, it's easier to preach than to

practice. Nevertheless, this generation of investors has kept the

faith and stayed the course during all the corrections mentioned

above. Judging by redemption calls from my old fund, Fidelity

Magellan, the customers have been brilliantly complacent. Only a

small percentage cashed out in the Saddam Hussein bear market of

1990.

Thanks to the day traders and some of the professional hedge fund

managers, shares now change hands at an incredible clip. In 1989,

three hundred million shares traded was a hectic session on the New

York Stock Exchange; today, three hundred million is a sleepy

interlude and eight hundred million is average. Have the day

traders given Mr. Market the shakes? Does the brisk commerce in

stock indexes have something to do with it? Whatever the cause (I

see day traders as a major factor), frequent trading has made the

stock markets more volatile. A decade ago stock prices moving up or

down more than 1 percent in a single trading session was a rare

occurrence. At present we get 1 percent moves several times a

month.

By the way, the odds against making a living in the day-trading

business are about the same as the odds against making a living at

race-tracks, blackjack tables, or video poker. In fact, I think of

day trading as at-home casino care. The drawback to the home casino

is the paper-work. Make twenty trades per day, and you could end up

with 5,000 trades a year, all of which must be recorded, tabulated,

and reported to the IRS. So day trading is a casino that supports a

lot of accountants.

People who want to know how stocks fared on any given day ask,

Where did the Dow close? I'm more interested in how many stocks

went up versus how many went down. These so-called advance/decline

numbers paint a more realistic picture. Never has this been truer

than in the recent exclusive market, where a few stocks advance

while the majority languish. Investors who buy "undervalued" small

stocks or midsize stocks have been punished for their prudence.

People are wondering: How can the S&P 500 be up 20 percent and

my stocks are down? The answer is that a few big stocks in the

S&P 500 are propping up the averages.

For instance, in 1998 the S&P 500 index was up 28 percent

overall, but when you take a closer look, you find out the 50

biggest companies in the index advanced 40 percent, while the other

450 companies hardly budged. In the NASDAQ market, home to the

Internet and its supporting cast, the dozen or so biggest companies

were huge winners, while the rest of the NASDAQ stocks, lumped

together, were losers. The same story was repeated in 1999, where

the elite group of winners skewed the averages and propped up the

multitude of losers. More than 1,500 stocks traded on the New York

Stock Exchange lost money in 1999. This dichotomy is unprecedented.

By the way, we tend to think the S&P 500 index is dominated by

huge companies, while the NASDAQ is a haven for the smaller fry. By

the late 1990s, NASDAQ's giants (Intel, Cisco, and a handful of

others) dominated the NASDAQ index more than the S&P 500's

giants dominated its index.

One industry that's teeming with small stocks is biotechnology. My

high-tech aversion caused me to make fun of the typical biotech

enterprise: $100 million in cash from selling shares, one hundred

Ph.D.'s, 99 microscopes, and zero revenues. Recent developments

inspire me to put in a good word for biotech -- not that amateurs

should pick their biotech stocks out of a barrel, but that biotech

in general could play the same role in the new century as

electronics played in the last. Today a long list of biotechs have

revenue, and three dozen or so turn a profit, with another fifty

ready to do the same. Amgen has become a genuine biotech blue chip,

with earnings of $1 billion plus. One of the numerous biotech

mutual funds might be worth a long-term commitment for part of your

money.

Market commentators fill airspace and magazine space with

comparisons between today's market and some earlier market, such as

"This looks a lot like 1962," or "This reminds me of 1981," or when

they're feeling very gloomy, "We're facing 1929 all over again."

Lately the prevailing comparison seems to be with the early 1970s,

when the smaller stocks faltered while the larger stocks

(especially the highly touted "Nifty Fifty") continued to rise.

Then, in the bear market of 1973-74, the Nifty Fifty fell 50-80

percent! This unsettling decline disproved the theory that big

companies were bearproof.

If you owned the Nifty Fifty and held on to the lot for twenty-five

years (preferably you were stranded on a desert island with no

radios, TV sets, or magazines that told you to abandon stocks

forever), you're not unhappy with the results. Though it took them

a generation to do it, the Nifty Fifty made a full recovery and

then some. By the mid-1990s the Nifty Fifty portfolio had caught up

and passed the Dow and the S&P 500 in total return since 1974.

Even if you bought them at sky-high prices in 1972, your choice was

vindicated.

Once again, we've got the fifty largest companies selling for

prices that skeptics describe as "too much to pay". Whether this

latter-day Nifty Fifty will suffer a markdown on the order of the

1973-74 fire sale is anybody's guess. History tells us that

corrections (declines of 10 percent or more) occur every couple of

years, and bear markets (declines of 20 percent or more) occur

every six years. Severe bear markets (declines of 30 percent or

more) have materialized five times since the 1929-32 doozie. It's

foolish to bet we've seen the last of the bears, which is why it's

important not to buy stocks or stock mutual funds with money you'll

need to spend in the next twelve months to pay college bills,

wedding bills, or whatever. You don't want to be forced to sell in

a losing market to raise cash. When you're a long-term investor,

time is on your side.

The long bull market continues to hit occasional potholes. When One

Up was written, stocks had just recovered from the 1987 crash. The

worst fall in fifty years coincided with a Lynch golfing vacation

in Ireland. It took nine or ten more trips (we bought a house in

Ireland) to convince me that my setting foot on Irish sod wouldn't

trigger another panic. I didn't feel too comfortable visiting

Israel, Indonesia, or India, either. Setting foot in countries that

begin with "I" made me nervous. But I made two trips to Israel and

two to India and one to Indonesia, and nothing happened.

So far, 1987 hasn't been repeated, but the bears arrived in 1990,

the year I left my job as manager of the Fidelity Magellan Fund.

While the 1987 decline scared a lot of people (a 35 percent drop in

two days can do that), to me the 1990 episode was scarier. Why? In

1987 the economy was perking along, and our banks weg market to

raise cash. When you're a long-term investor, time is on your

side.

The long bull market continues to hit occasional potholes. When One

Up was written, stocks had just recovered from the 1987 crash. The

worst fall in fifty years coincided with a Lynch golfing vacation

in Ireland. It took nine or ten more trips (we bought a house in

Ireland) to convince me that my setting foot on Irish sod wouldn't

trigger another panic. I didn't feel too comfortable visiting

Israel, Indonesia, or India, either. Setting foot in countries that

begin with "I" made me nervous. But I made two trips to Israel and

two to India and one to Indonesia, and nothing happened.

So far, 1987 hasn't been repeated, but the bears arrived in 1990,

the year I left my job as manager of the Fidelity Magellan Fund.

While the 1987 decline scared a lot of people (a 35 percent drop in

two days can do that), to me the 1990 episode was scarier. Why? In

1987 the economy was perking along, and our banks were solvent, so

the fundamentals were positive. In 1990 the country was falling

into recession, our biggest banks were on the ropes, and we were

preparing for war with Iraq. But soon enough the war was won and

recession overcome, the banks recovered, and stocks took off on

their biggest climb in modern history. More recently we've seen 10

percent declines in the major averages in the spring of 1996, the

summers of 1997 and 1998, and the fall of 1999. August of 1998

brought the S&P 500 down 14.5 percent, the second worst month

since World War II. Nine months later stocks were off and running

again, with the S&P 500 up more than 50 percent!

What's my point in recounting all this? It would be wonderful if we

could avoid the setbacks with timely exits, but nobody has figured

out how to predict them. Moreover, if you exit stocks and avoid a

decline, how can you be certain you'll get back into stocks for the

next rally? Here's a telling scenario: If you put $100,000 in

stocks on July 1, 1994, and stayed fully invested for five years,

your $100,000 grew into $341,722. But if you were out of stocks for

just thirty days over that stretch -- the thirty days when stocks

had their biggest gains -- your $100,000 turned into a

disappointing $153,792. By staying in the market, you more than

doubled your reward.

As a very successful investor once said: "The bearish argument

always sounds more intelligent." You can find good reasons to

scuttle your equities in every morning paper and on every broadcast

of the nightly news. When One Up became a best-seller, so did Ravi

Batra's The Great Depression of 1990. The obituary for this bull

market has been written countless times going back to its start in

1982. Among the likely causes: Japan's sick economy, our trade

deficit with China and the world, the bond market collapse of 1994,

the emerging market collapse of 1997, global warming, ozone

depletion, deflation, the Gulf war, consumer debt, and the latest,

Y2K. The day after New Year's, we discovered that Y2K was the most

overrated scare since Godzilla's last movie.

"Stocks are overpriced," has been the bears' rallying cry for

several years. To some, stocks looked too expensive in 1989, at Dow

2,600. To others, they looked extravagant in 1992, above Dow 3,000.

A chorus of naysayers surfaced in 1995, above Dow 4,000. Someday

we'll see another severe bear market, but even a brutal 40 percent

sell-off would leave prices far above the point at which various

pundits called for investors to abandon their portfolios. As I've

noted on prior occasions: "That's not to say there's no such thing

as an overvalued market, but there's no point worrying about

it."

It's often said a bull market must scale a wall of worry, and the

worries never cease. Lately we've worried our way through various

catastrophic "unthinkables": World War III, biological Armageddon,

rogue nukes, the melting of the polar ice caps, a meteor crashing

into the earth, and so on. Meanwhile we've witnessed several

beneficial "unthinkables": communism falls; federal and state

governments in the United States run budget surpluses; America

creates seventeen million new jobs in the 1990s, more than making

up for the highly publicized "downsizing" of big companies. The

downsizing caused disruption and heartache to the recipients of the

pink slips, but it also freed up millions of workers to move into

exciting and productive jobs in fast-growing small companies.

This astounding job creation doesn't get the attention it deserves.

America has the lowest unemployment rate of the past half century,

while Europe continues to suffer from widespread idleness. Big

European companies also have downsized, but Europe lacks the small

businesses to take up the slack. They have a higher savings rate

than we do, their citizens are well educated, yet their

unemployment rate is more than twice the U.S. rate. Here's another

astounding development: Fewer people were employed in Europe at the

end of 1999 than were employed at the end of the prior

decade.

The basic story remains simple and never-ending. Stocks aren't

lottery tickets. There's a company attached to every share.

Companies do better or they do worse. If a company does worse than

before, its stock will fall. If a company does better, its stock

will rise. If you own good companies that continue to increase

their earnings, you'll do well. Corporate profits are up

fifty-five-fold since World War II, and the stock market is up

sixtyfold. Four wars, nine recessions, eight presidents, and one

impeachment didn't change that.

In the following table, you'll find the names of 20 companies that

made the top 100 list of winners in the U.S. stock market in the

1990s. The number in the left-hand column shows where each of these

companies ranked in total return on the investor's dollar. Many

high-tech enterprises (the likes of Helix, Photronics, Siliconix,

Theragenics) that cracked the top 100 are omitted here, because I

wanted to showcase the opportunities that the average person could

have noticed, researched, and taken advantage of. Dell Computer was

the biggest winner of all, and who hasn't heard of Dell? Anybody

could have noticed Dell's strong sales and the growing popularity

of its product. People who bought shares early were rewarded with

an amazing 889-bagger: $10,000 invested in Dell from the outset

generated an $8.9 million fortune. You didn't have to understand

computers to see the promise in Dell, Microsoft, or Intel (every

new machine came with an "Intel Inside" sticker). You didn't have

to be a genetic engineer to realize that Amgen had transformed

itself from a research lab into a pharmaceutical manufacturer with

two best-selling drugs.

Schwab? His success was hard to miss. Home Depot? It continued to

grow at a rapid clip, making the top 100 list for the second decade

in a row. Harley Davidson? All those lawyers, doctors, and dentists

becoming weekend Easy Riders was great news for Harley. Lowe's?

Home Depot all over again. Who would have predicted two monster

stocks from the same mundane business? Paychex? Small businesses

everywhere were curing a headache by letting Paychex handle their

payroll. My wife, Carolyn, used Paychex in our family foundation

work, and I missed the clue and missed the stock.

Some of the best gains of the decade (as has been the case in prior

decades) came from old-fashioned retailing. The Gap, Best Buy,

Staples, Dollar General -- these were all megabaggers and

well-managed companies that millions of shoppers experienced

firsthand. That two small banks appear on this list shows once

again that big winners can come from any industry -- even a stodgy

slow-growth industry like banking. My advice for the next decade:

Keep on the lookout for tomorrow's big baggers. You're likely to

find one.

-- Peter Lynch with John Rothchild

Introduction to the Millennium Edition

PROLOGUE: A Note from Ireland

INTRODUCTION: The Advantages of Dumb Money

PART I Preparing to Invest

1 The Making of a Stockpicker

2 The Wall Street Oxymorons

3 Is This Gambling, or What?

4 Passing the Mirror Test

5 Is This a Good Market? Please Don't Ask

PART II Picking Winners

6 Stalking the Tenbagger

7 I've Got It, I've Got It--What Is It?

8 The Perfect Stock, What a Deal!

9 Stocks I'd Avoid

10 Earnings, Earnings, Earnings

11 The Two-Minute Drill

12 Getting the Facts

13 Some Famous Numbers

14 Rechecking the Storv

15 The Final Checklist

PART 111 The Long-term View

16 Designing a Portfolio

17 The Best Time to Buy and Sell

18 The Twelve Silliest (andMost Dangerous) Things People Say About

Stock Prices

19 Options, Futures, and Shorts

20 50,000 Frenchmen Can Be Wrong

EPILOGUE: Caught with My Pants Up

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INDEX

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在线阅读地址：One Up On Wall Street : How To Use What You Already Know To Make Money In The Market彼得·林奇的成功投资在线阅读

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在线购买地址：One Up On Wall Street : How To Use What You Already Know To Make Money In The Market彼得·林奇的成功投资在线购买

第57页：

开始投资股票前，投资者都应该首先问自己以下三个个人问题：

1、我有一套房子吗？

2、我未来需要钱吗？

3、我具备股票投资成功所必需的个人素质吗？

第61页：

林奇认为股票投资成功所必需的个人素质：耐心、自立、常识、对于痛苦的忍耐力、心胸开阔、超然、坚持不懈、谦逊、灵活、愿意独立研究、能够主动承认错误以及能够在市场普遍恐慌之中不受影响保持冷静的能力。

在股市上涨的第一个阶段——股市已经下跌了一段时间以至于根本没有人预测股市会上涨——人们都不愿谈论股票。

当10个人宁愿与牙医谈论有关治疗牙斑的事情而不愿与一个共同基金经理人谈论股票时，很可能故事将要止跌反弹了。

在第二个阶段，在我回答我是一个共同基金经理人后，新认识的客人在我身边逗留的时间会长一些——可能长得足够告诉我股票市场的风险有多大——然后他们又去和牙医交谈了，在鸡尾酒会上谈的更多的仍然是牙斑而不是股票。从第一个阶段开始到第二个阶段股市已经上涨了15%，但是几乎没有人注意到这一点。

在第三个阶段，随着股市从第一个阶段至此已经上涨了30%，一大群兴致勃勃的人整晚都围在我的身边，根本不理会牙医的存在。一个又一个热情的客人把我拉到一旁问我应该买哪知股票，甚至连牙医也会这样问我。酒会上的每一个人都把钱投在了某一只股票上，他们都在谈论股市未来走势将会如何。

在第四个阶段，他们再一次簇拥到我的周围，但是这一次是他们告诉我应该买哪些股票，甚至是牙医也会向我推荐三五只股票。过了几天，我在报纸上看到了有关那位牙医向我推荐的股票的评论，并且它们的股价都已经上涨了。当邻居告诉我该买哪知股票，而且后来股价上涨后我非常后悔没有听从他们的建议时，这是一个股市已经上涨到了最高点而将要下跌的准确信号。

由于某些原因，股票分析这一行被搞得看起来非常神秘又高深莫测，让业余投资者敬而远之，以至于那些在日常消费中非常谨慎的业余投资者在股票投资上却非常轻率，只是一念之间就将一生的积蓄都投在了某只根本没有仔细研究过的股票上面。一对夫妇可以花费整整一个周末的时间来寻找去伦敦的最低机票，但是当他们购买500股荷兰航空公司(KLM)的股票时在分析这家公司上花费的时间连5分钟都不到。

投资的窍门不是要学会相信自己内心的感觉，而是要约束自己不去理会内心的感觉。只要公司的基本面没有什么根本的变化，就一直持有你手中的股票。

这种产品对公司净利润的影响有多大

编辑推荐

Anise C. Wallace The New York Times Mr. Lynch's investment

record puts him in a league by himself. -- Review

Peter Lynch is America's number-one money manager. His mantra:

Average investors can become experts in their own field and can

pick winning stocks as effectively as Wall Street professionals by

doing just a little research.

Now, in a new introduction written specifically for this edition of

One Up on Wall Street, Lynch gives his take on the incredible rise

of Internet stocks, as well as a list of twenty winning companies

of high-tech '90s. That many of these winners are low-tech supports

his thesis that amateur investors can continue to reap exceptional

rewards from mundane, easy-to-understand companies they encounter

in their daily lives.

Investment opportunities abound for the layperson, Lynch says. By

simply observing business developments and taking notice of your

immediate world -- from the mall to the workplace -- you can

discover potentially successful companies before professional

analysts do. This jump on the experts is what produces

"tenbaggers," the stocks that appreciate tenfold or more and turn

an average stock portfolio into a star performer.

The former star manager of Fidelity's multibillion-dollar Magellan

Fund, Lynch reveals how he achieved his spectacular record. Writing

with John Rothchild, Lynch offers easy-to-follow directions for

sorting out the long shots from the no shots by reviewing a

company's financial statements and by identifying which numbers

really count. He explains how to stalk tenbaggers and lays out the

guidelines for investing in cyclical, turnaround, and fast-growing

companies.

Lynch promises that if you ignore the ups and downs of the market

and the endless speculation about interest rates, in the long term

(anywhere from five to fifteen years) your portfolio will reward

you. This advice has proved to be timeless and has made One Up on

Wall Street a number-one bestseller. And now this classic is as

valuable in the new millennium as ever.

中文版《彼得·林奇的成功投资》购买请点击>>>>

媒体评论

From Publishers Weekly The authors argue that average investors

can beat Wall Street professionals by using the information gleaned

from everyday life. "Investors will be able to put the shrewd

insights presented to good use," remarked PW. 200,000 first

书籍介绍

Book Description

THE NATIONAL BESTSELLING BOOK THAT EVERY INVESTOR SHOULD OWN

Peter Lynch is America's number-one money manager. His mantra: Average investors can become experts in their own field and can pick winning stocks as effectively as Wall Street professionals by doing just a little research.

Now, in a new introduction written specifically for this edition of One Up on Wall Street, Lynch gives his take on the incredible rise of Internet stocks, as well as a list of twenty winning companies of high-tech '90s. That many of these winners are low-tech supports his thesis that amateur investors can continue to reap exceptional rewards from mundane, easy-to-understand companies they encounter in their daily lives.

Investment opportunities abound for the layperson, Lynch says. By simply observing business developments and taking notice of your immediate world -- from the mall to the workplace -- you can discover potentially successful companies before professional analysts do. This jump on the experts is what produces "tenbaggers," the stocks that appreciate tenfold or more and turn an average stock portfolio into a star performer.

The former star manager of Fidelity's multibillion-dollar Magellan Fund, Lynch reveals how he achieved his spectacular record. Writing with John Rothchild, Lynch offers easy-to-follow directions for sorting out the long shots from the no shots by reviewing a company's financial statements and by identifying which numbers really count. He explains how to stalk tenbaggers and lays out the guidelines for investing in cyclical, turnaround, and fast-growing companies.

Lynch promises that if you ignore the ups and downs of the market and the endless speculation about interest rates, in the long term (anywhere from five to fifteen years) your portfolio will reward you. This advice has proved to be timeless and has made One Up on Wall Street a number-one bestseller. And now this classic is as valuable in the new millennium as ever.

From Publishers Weekly

The authors argue that average investors can beat Wall Street professionals by using the information gleaned from everyday life. "Investors will be able to put the shrewd insights presented to good use," remarked PW. 200,000 first printing.

Book Dimension

length: (cm)20.6 　　　 　　　　　 　　　　　 width:(cm)14